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A Very Special Relationship:
Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht
Generals and the Debate on
West German Rearmament,
1945-1953
Alaric Searle
n May 1945, as the Second World War was drawing to a close, the
British journalist and military writer Basil Liddell Hart was some-
thing of a forlorn figure. At the outbreak of war in 1939 he had been
the leading military commentator in Britain, politically well connected
and influential, and had also established a formidable reputation as a
military theorist and historian; however, the rapid defeat of France had
discredited his theories, leaving him isolated and with no role in the
war effort.1 But after the end of the Second World War he managed
to establish contact with a group of German generals who found them-
selves imprisoned in Grizedale Hall in the north of England, and he
soon realized that here was a potentially malleable group of individuals
who could help him re-establish his reputation as a military authority.
The generals themselves also quickly realized that the meetings with
Liddell Hart could be employed for their own purposes. That Liddell
Hart was more than a little opportunistic in the use he made of his
contacts with former Wehrmacht generals has been generally recog-
Although Liddell Hart wrote in his memoirs that the Polish campaign was the first
triumphant demonstration of the new Blitzkrieg technique - against opponents who
had failed to comprehend it', in his book The Defence of Britain, published in 1939,
he had talked of 'the increasing advantage of the defence over attack' and declared,
'The dream of victory in modem war is faced by the hard fact of the long-proved
superiority of the modem tactical defensive', even stating that 'the soldier's dream of
the "lightning war" has a decreasing prospect of fulfilment' (B.H. Liddell Hart,
Memoirs ii (London, 1965), p. 256; The Defence of Britain (London, 1939), pp. 27, 38,
42).
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nized by historians and by his friends2 yet the extent and nature of
these contacts has not been discussed in the detail which is possible
given the extensive source material available. More importantly, the
fact that these contacts were to lead to one of the most interesting
aspects of Liddell Hart's career - his involvement in the debate on
West German rearmament - has been passed over by historians in
silence.
At present, we have two studies of Liddell Hart, both of which have
examined the writer's relationship to Wehrmacht generals. In his
monograph, Brian Bond concentrates on the interest in Liddell Hart's
books in the German army between the world wars, but also devotes
several pages to Liddell Hart's contact with German generals after the
Second World War. As well as discussing the assistance in his historical
research which he received from these generals, Bond briefly mentions
the efforts made by Liddell Hart on behalf of imprisoned generals, as
well as his criticism of the war crimes trials. In his discussion, Bond
mainly emphasizes Liddell Hart's sense of fair play and his opposition
to a harsh peace for Germany.3John Mearsheimer, on the other hand,
interprets Liddell Hart's friendly relations with Wehrmacht generals
purely in terms of a Machiavellian plot by Liddell Hart to 'resurrect
his lost reputation'.4 Both interpretations contain an element of truth,
but neither Bond nor Mearsheimer has made any reference to either
the true extent and nature of Liddell Hart's contacts with Wehrmacht
generals or the way in which these contacts led to Liddell Hart's
involvement in the campaign spearheaded by some generals for a West
German 'defence contribution'.
The almost complete lack of attention which this aspect of Liddell
Hart's biography has received is, at first glance, surprising given the
volume of material relating to it in his papers. However, the nature of
the alliance between the writer and the generals only becomes fully
comprehensible when one examines German archive materials relat-
ing to the rearmament debate,5 and in particular the files which reveal
the involvement of former generals in the moves to create new German
armed forces. Moreover, interest among non-German scholars of the
social, political and military aspects of the rearmament debate within
2 Cf. J. Luvaas, The Mearsheimer Critique: A Pupil's Retrospective', Parameters XX
(Mar. 1990), pp. 12f£; J. Keegan, 'Mounting an Offensive on a Scientist of War',
Dai4y Telegraph 2 Mar. 1989. In the early 1950s Liddell Hart was criticized more
generally for 'being lenient and too forgiving [towards the Germans]' (Col. RJ. Icks,
'Liddell Hart: One View', Armor LXI (Nov./Dec. 1952), p. 26).
3 B. Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Milita?y Thought (London, 1977), pp. 180-90,
215-37.
4 JJ. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of Histony (London, 1988), pp. 184-201.
5 For further details on the extent of archive material available in Germany, see D.
Krulger and D. Ganser, 'Quellen zur Planung des Verteidigungsbeitrages der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950 bis 1955 in westdeutschen Archiven',
Militdrgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 49 (1991), pp. 121-46.
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Germany has been decidedly low,6 most English-speaking historians
having preferred to see the issue within the rather restrictive frame-
work of the diplomatic negotiations between Germany and the victori-
ous Western powers.7 Given the central importance of the rearmament
debate for the early history of the Federal Republic, predictably this
has been in sharp contrast to the extensive scholarly study of rearma-
ment within Germany over the past 15 years or so.8
This article aims to fill the aforementioned gap in the research to
date on Liddell Hart's career and ideas by relating how he came to be
involved in the campaign for West German rearmament, the role this
played in his postwar relations with German generals and the extent
of his involvement in public debate on the issue not only in Britain but
equally in Western Germany. The article cannot attempt to examine all
aspects of Liddell Hart's collaboration with Wehrmacht generals, and
thus what follows will be more in the nature of an overview of his
part in the rearmament debate. In undertaking this overview of his
involvement with the generals and the issue of rearmament, four main
areas suggest themselves as being particularly important: first, the
initial contacts between Liddell Hart and the generals imprisoned at
POW Camp No. 1 in 1945/46; second, the role of his book, The Other
Side of the Hill, in establishing a reputation for him as an authority on
the German military leadership during the Second World War and the
significance of its publication for the debate on rearmament; third, his
active participation in the rearmament debate in West Germany from
6 The number of m onographs on rearmament is limited. Cf. MJ. Lowry, The Forge of
West C.rman Rearmament: Theodor Blank and the Amt Blank (New York, 1990); D.
Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West Gsrman Armed
Forces (Princeton, NJ, 1988); G.D. Drummond, The C.rman Social Dermocrats in
Opposition 1949-1960: The Case Agaimt RearmaTmet (Norman, OK, 1982); J. Diehi, The
Thanks of the Fatherland: C.rman Vetkram after the Second World War (Chapel Hill, NC,
1993). Of these works, Diehl's subject-matter is only very generally related to
rearmament, Abenheim merely deals with the subject in the opening sections of his
monograph, while Lowry and Drummond base their analyses on published sources
alone. It is only with the recent publication of D.C. Large, Gemam to the Front: West
C.rman Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996) that the English-
speaking reader can consult a volume which integrates the social and political
aspects of the question into the foreign policy picture.
7 A recent work is S. Dockrill, Britains Poliqy for West Gsrman Rearmamet 1950-1 955
(London, 1991). A similar approach can be found in R. McGeehan, The Gsrman
RearmaTmet Question: American Diplomacy and Europsan Defense after World War H
(Urbana, IL, 1971), and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Col. S.M. Kanarowski, The
G.rman Army and NATO Stratgy (Washington, DC, 1982), pp. 1-40.
It would be inappropriate to provide a full list of German monographs here, but the
following works are particularly noteworthy: D. Wagner, FDP und Wiederbewaffinung:
Die weArpolitische Orientierung der Liberalen in der Bundesepuhlik Deutschland 1949-1955
(Boppard, 1979); A. Doering-Manteuffel, Katholizismus und Wederbewaffinung (Mainz,
1981); MGFA [MilitUrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt], ed., Anfdnge westdeutsclwr
Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, I: Von der Kapitulation bAs zum PletnsPlan (Munich, 1982);
II: Die EVG'PAse (Munich, 1990); III: Die NATO-Gption (Munich, 1993); H. Brill,
Bogislaw von Bonin im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wiederbewaffinung - Westintegration -
Wiedewereinigung: Ein Beitrag zur EntsteAungsgescAicAte der BundesweAr 1952-1955
(Baden-Baden, 1987).
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1950 to 1953; and, finally, the differing motives which led the generals
and Liddell Hart to cooperate so closely.
First Discussions in POW Camp No. 1, 1945-1946
In the spring and summer of 1945, No. 1 POW Camp at Grizedale Hall
in the north of England began to fill up with captured German gen-
erals. Grizedale Hall was apparently a grey, rather unattractive build-
ing, and huts built to accommodate the prisoners added to the gloomy
impression. However, the location of the camp turned out to be a
stroke of luck for Basil Liddell Hart, who lived only five miles away at
that time and, equally fortuitously, had a family connection in the Re-
education section of the Political Warfare Department, through whom
he was able to secure a pass for the camp.9 To gain access to a top
POW camp right after the war had ended was no small feat, and it
appears that this was only possible because Liddell Hart was given
official clearance by the War Office as a Political Intelligence Depart-
ment lecturer taking part in the Re-education programme.10 Liddell
Hart was informed on 21 July 1945 that arrangements were being made
for visits to Grizedale Hall, and that he would be required to give a
talk to a group and then conduct a question-and-answer style dis-
cussion, but he insisted that he be allowed 'more individual talks' in
which 're-educational ideas' would be subtly implanted into the gen-
erals' minds. Soon after, he arranged for his first visit to No. 1 POW
Camp, on 9 August 1945.11 Once inside the camp, however, and while
the going was good, he went ahead and conducted his own 'interrog-
ations' at Grizedale.12
In all, Liddell Hart seems to have made at least 15 separate visits to
No. 1 POW Camp, where he met various generals and conducted his
own interviews with 12 of them, including Field Marshal Gerd von
Rundstedt, Panzer-Generals Hasso von Manteuffel and Wilhelm Ritter
von Thoma and Generals Kurt Student, Gottfried Heinrici and Edgar
Rbhricht.13 He was able to meet some generals on several occasions,
and conducted three lengthy interviews with von Manteuffel, four with
von Rundstedt and seven with Infantry-General Guinther Blumentritt.14
Since Liddell Hart could not speak German, his historical interviews
9 M.B. Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace: Four Hundred Thomand German Prsoners of War and
the People of Britain 1944-1948 (London, 1977), pp. 231 f
10 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London (hereafter
LHCMA), Liddell Hart Papers (hereafter LHP) 9/24/90, Wing-Commander N.
Roffey (PID, Foreign Office) to Liddell Hart, 31 Jan. 1946.
1 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Liddell Hart to Wing-Commander N. Roffey, 9 Feb. 1946.
12 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Barry S. Sullivan to Liddell Hart, 9 Jan. 1946.
Sullivan puts the number of visits at 16 (Thresholds of Peace, p. 233). However, after a
thorough search of all the relevant files in the Liddell Hart Papers (9/24/90-154), it
has only been possible to establish evidence of 15 visits.
4 Liddell Hart's notes on these interviews are located in the Liddell Hart Papers at:
9/24/93 (Blumentritt), 9/24/125 (von Manteuffel) and 9/24/132 (von Rundstedt).
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were carried out with the aid of an interpreter, Captain F.S. Kingston,
who later translated some of the generals' notes and memoranda.15 It
is clear from the evidence available that the visits made by Liddell Hart
brightened up the dull prison camp routine and were welcomed by
the generals at the camp, although the positive reception which he
received seems to have been more due to his understanding treatment
of Germany's postwar situation in his lectures than any recollections
of his interwar writings on the part of the generals. Several visits
involved a talk by Liddell Hart followed by discussions which on some
occasions dealt with the issues surrounding Germany/s political
future,1 with Rear-Admiral S.H. Engel often acting as an interpreter.17
The visits were particularly appreciated by the ailing Field Marshal von
Rundstedt, who was touched by Liddell Hart's kindness in bringing
him presents and lending him a mattress which helped him to sleep
more easily.18
From Liddell Hart's notes on his personal 'interrogations' with some
of the generals, it is interesting to note not only how detailed they
were but also that the Englishman's questions, and more importantly
the generals' comments, were not simply concerned with establishing
facts concerning specific campaigns, battles or tactics.19 Many conver-
sations revolved around future military organization and the threat of
the Russians. General von Thoma, for instance, remarked in a conver-
sation of 20 November 1945 that it would be dangerous to draw lessons
from the African campaign and apply them to Russia because 'For you
in future it is only Russia that matters - not the desert anymore'.20
Panzer-General Hasso von Manteuffel also seemed to have had his
mind on future developments when, during one of his talks with Lid-
dell Hart on the Ardennes offensive, he 'reverted to the question of
future army organization', noting that under modern conditions an
army needed to create an elite within its structure which received the
best equipment and personnel.21 Moreover, the desire to discuss likely
postwar developments did not come solely from the side of the Ger-
15 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Liddell Hart to Capt. F.S. Kingston, 12 Dec. 1947, and 9
May 1949; B. H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill: Germany/s Cenerals Their Rse
and Eall with Their Own Account of Milita?y Eents 1939-1945 (London, 2nd enlarged
edn, 1951), p. 8. Sullivan incorrectly identifies the interpreter as a Capt. Kingsford
(Thresholds of Peace, p. 233).
16 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, B.H.L.H., Report on Talks at POW Camps, 12 Jan. 1946,
pp. 1-3.
17 LHCMA, LHP 5/15, Liddell Hart to Dr Vermehren, 30 July 1948.
8 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/132, B.H.L.H., Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's 70th
Birthday, 12 Dec. 1945.
9 Of course, in many conversations the emphasis was specifically on the conduct of a
battle as seen through the eyes of a particular general. See e.g. LHCMA, LHP
9/24/101, (B.H.L.H.) Notes for History. Talk with General Elfeldt, 31 Dec. 1945, in
which the Normandy battle was discussed.
20 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/144, (B.H.L.H.) Notes for History, (2nd) Talk with General von
Thoma, 20 Nov. 1945, p. 1.
21 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/125, (B.H.L.H.) Notes for History, (3rd) Talk with General von
Manteuffel, 17 Dec. 1945, Ardennes offensive continued, p. 5.
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man generals. Liddell Hart had given one of the generals copies of
his articles on 'The Revolution in Warfare' which had appeared in the
World Review in May and June 1945, and these had been translated and
circulated among the high-ranking prisoners. Colonel-General Hein-
rici was one of those who referred to the articles during a talk with
Liddell Hart, noting how interesting he had found the views of his
'interrogator' on the superiority of defence over attack.22
Nonetheless, despite the remarkably good relations between Liddell
Hart and the generals in the latter half of 1945, the Englishman
appeared able to recognize the lack of political understanding on the
part of his audience, and this comes through clearly in his report to
the War Office describing his visits to Grizedale and another camp at
Shap, POW Camp No. 13. During his visit to Grizedale on 1 November
1945, for example, he noted: 'There was particular interest in the idea
of a Western European Federation, but few of the group - apart from
Tippelskirch - seemed capable of grasping the idea of a federation, as
distinct from a league or alliance.'23 In fact, summing up his general
impressions of the visits, he concluded that '60 per cent [of the gen-
erals] are apolitical vacuum-men who have hitherto concentrated upon
their professional work and have never thought about wider questions'.
While he warned of the danger of ascribing Nazi motives to generals
who were simply being practical about the military benefits of the regi-
me's attitude to paramilitary training, he also was aware of the oppor-
tunistic attitude of many of the German generals towards Hitler's
regime - when the going was good, supporting the party line.24
But were the generals the 'apolitical vacuum-men' Liddell Hart
imagined them to be? And did they see their conversations with Liddell
Hart as an informed professional discussion of the history of the war
in which they had just fought - or were there other motives behind
their statements? One incident reveals much about the generals' atti-
tude towards Liddell Hart. One of the British army officers at the
Grizedale Camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Faulk, recalled later that
when he had asked the generals on 28 December 1945 whether they
wanted to meet with Liddell Hart the following day, several senior gen-
erals had huddled together and discussed what 'historical line' they
should take in their conversation with their prestigious visitor. Faulk,
who had acute hearing as well as a near-perfect knowledge of German,
overheard this, and went to see Liddell Hart, reporting what he had
heard. But Liddell Hart refused to believe him. Faulk interpreted this
reaction as being due to Liddell Hart's belief in an elitist and chival-
22 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/1 10, (B.H.L.H.) Notes for History. Talk with Colonel-General
Heinrici, 12 Dec. 1945, p. 1. The translated articles are also mentioned in LHP
9/24/132, (B.H.L.H.) Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's 70th birthday, 12 Dec
1945.
23 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, B.H.L.H., Report on Talks at P.O.W. Camps, p. 2.
24 p. Ct., pp. 1 f
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rous form of society in which a general could only be a gentleman.25
However, did Liddell Hart really believe this? In the winter of 1945/6,
with war crimes trials looming on the horizon, he was one of the few
allies the Wehrmacht generals had. Moreover, he had taken a keen
interest in the subject of war crimes trials as early as September 1945,
when he had made contact with Sir Hartley Shawcross, who was in
charge of war crimes prosecution for the British.26 Liddell Hart evi-
dently realized that through his connections in the War Office, and
throughout the upper echelons of the British establishment, he could
offer assistance to the generals.
In fact, shortly before Liddell Hart's contact with the prisoners at
Grizedale ended, he was actually approached by three of the generals -
Heinrici, Rdhricht and Bechtolsheim - for advice on whether they
ought to press for counsel to represent the generals collectively at the
Nuremberg Trials. Liddell Hart suggested that 'as Halder had gone to
Nuremberg, they might leave it to him to look after the concerns of
the General Staff as a whole'. He also told the three generals that they
would have to take into consideration the fact that were they to press
the issue they might 'attract attention to themselves'. But, on the other
hand, if they decided to pursue the matter, it would seem best 'to
concentrate on the point that they were exposed to a danger, under
the broad terms of the Indictment, of being condemned unheard,
through the subsequent application to them of a verdict given against
some other members of the military organization with whom they had
only a remote connection'.27 Thus, even though Liddell Hart emphas-
ized that 'they must weigh up the matter for themselves', it is clear
that he was well aware of the uncertain situation the generals were in.
In short, the conversations on the events of the Second World War at
Grizedale had taken place against anything other than a background
of detached scholarly enquiry.
In February 1946 Liddell Hart's War Office pass was cancelled, and
while he made repeated efforts to try and visit the generals from No. 1
POW Camp who had been moved in January 1946 to No. 11 POW
Camp at Island Farm, Bridgend, in Wales, these attempts failed.28 The
War Office dragged its feet and refused to give a clear answer to his
repeated requests to be allowed to visit the camp, although in March
25 Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, pp. 327 f For biographical details on Faulk, and further
information on his work with German POWs, see Imperial War Museum, Dept of
Sound Records, Acc. No. 9743/06, transcript of taped interView with Lt. Col. Henry
Faulk, n.d.
26 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/155, Liddell Hart to Sir Hartley ShawcroSs, 11 Sept. 1945, and
B.H.L.H., Notes for History. Talk with Sir Hartley Shawcross (the new Attomney-
General), 28 Sept. 1945.
27 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/130, [B.H.L.H.] Notes for History. Talk with Generals Heinrici,
Ro [e]hricht, and Bechtolsheim, 3 Jan. 1946, p. 1.
28 Sullivan, Thresholds of Peace, p. 239. The correspondence between Liddell Hart and
the War Office over the former's requests to be allowed to visit the generals ran on
into 1947. See LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Liddell Hart to Maj. E. Topham (Island
Farm, Bridgend), 1 and 11 Apr. 1947.
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1946 he was given the opportunity of corresponding with those gen-
erals he had known before the war.29 He had been warned earlier, in
January 1946, by his family contact in the Political Intelligence Depart-
ment that 'The War Office simply must not know that you have been
interrogating . . . [the generals], because they are touchy, jealous and
scared of publicity'.30 Another PID contact, Wing Commander Roffey,
explained to Liddell Hart that the cause of the trouble was that the
colonel in charge of intelligence at POW Camp No. 1 had started to
question the authority by which Liddell Hart was being allowed into
the camp. Roffey suspected, however, that the real reason for the
colonel's objections was that he himself was involved in writing a his-
torical study and was afraid of the competition.31 Nevertheless, despite
the break in personal contact with the generals, the friendships he had
made at Grizedale, and the information he had been able to gather,
ushered in a new period in Liddell Hart's career.
The Other Side of the Hill, 1948-1950
The most tangible result of Liddell Hart's talks with the generals at
Grizedale Hall was the book which resulted from them, The Other Side
oftheHill First published in 1948, it not only assisted in reviving Liddell
Hart's reputation as a historian in Britain, but also met with wide
acclaim in Germany, particularly when the German translation of the
second edition was published in 1950 under the title Jetzt dgrfen sze
reden (Now they are allowed to speak) .32 The book aimed to describe
the Wehrmacht's successes under Hitler through the eyes of the Ger-
man generals themselves. This approach of relying principally on the
statements of imprisoned generals naturally came in for its fair share
of criticism, and a British army brigadier posted to the Cabinet Office,
Historical Section, remarked to Liddell Hart: 'Memory is a funny thing
and I am afraid that a great many of the statements made now in good
faith by the German leaders from Rundstedt downwards are contra-
dicted by their own contemporary records.'33 However, in replying to
the sceptical brigadier, Liddell Hart commented that 'the presentation
of their [i.e., the generals'] evidence in my book looks much more
simple than the process of obtaining it proved'. He also pointed out
that whenever possible he had tried 'to get several checks on any parti-
29 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Brig. Hirsch (War Office) to Liddell Hart, 12 Mar. 1946.
30 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Barry S. Sullivan to Liddell Hart, 9 Jan. 1946.31 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Wing Commander N. Roffey to Liddell Hart, 20 Feb. 1946.
32 B.H. Liddell Hart, Jetzt drffen sie eden: Hitlers Generale bericAten (Stuttgart, 1950),
translated by Generalleutnant a.D. Kurt Dittmar. A German translation of the first
edition, also translated by Dittmar, had already been published the previous year in
Switzerland under the title Die Strategie einer Diktatur: Aufstieg und Fall deutscehr
Generate (Zflrich, 1949). For a typically positive reaction by a former professional
soldier, see General der Artillerie a.D. M. Fretter-Pico's review in WeArwisenschaftliche
Rundschau I (2) (1951), pp. 38 f.
33 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/16, Brig. H.B. Latham to Liddell Hart, 19 Apr. 1948.
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cular statement that came nearest to being generally agreed'.34 Never-
theless, given the conditions under which he obtained his information,
and the lack of deeper knowledge of the events of the Second
World War at that time, there is no doubt that the book was a great
achievement.
During the course of preparing The Other Side of the Hill for publi-
cation, Liddell Hart had only very limited contact with the generals he
had met at Grizedale, despite a desire on the part of both writer and
prisoners that a dialogue should continue. In actual fact, by the end
of 1947 many of the generals who had been held in Britain had been
shipped back to Germany, where they were either released35 or
detained in other camps. Others had ended up at the US Army Histori-
cal Division Camp at Neustadt, near Marburg, in the US zone. From
there, Gfnther Blumentritt was able to write to Liddell Hart in April
1947, informing him that three of the generals who had been at Grize-
dale, von Manteuffel, von Tippelskirch and Rdhricht, were with him
in the same camp working on historical projects.36 By mid-1948 how-
ever, the majority of generals had been released from captivity, and
Liddell Hart was gradually able to renew old acquaintances by letter,
despite the unreliable postal routes which existed at that time in the
ruins of postwar Germany. Indeed, publication of The Other Side of the
Hill came at an opportune moment for Liddell Hart. He was able to
send copies to various generals, most of whom wrote back either offer-
ing their reactions or simply lavishing praise on the book and its
author.37
The reception of the book in Britain, Germany and among former
generals was in actual fact to have far-reaching consequences for Lid-
dell Hart's career, his reputation and most of all his standing and auth-
ority in Germany; as far as his reputation in Germany was concerned,
the success of the book was to provide enough publicity to help him
play a part in the rearmament debate in West Germany in the early
1950s. Among the many generals who commented on The Other Side of
the Hill was Panzer-General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, a staunch
opponent of the Nazi Party, who wrote from POW Camp No. 11 at
Bridgend, 'I think it is quite amazing how you found your way to the
other side of the hill - quite alone but carrying of course practically
no weight of prejudice. What a change for a historian not to be
shackled by such.'38 It is worth mentioning von Senger's tribute as,
34 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/16: Liddell Hart to Latham, 1 May 1948.
3' In Dec. 1947 Generaloberst Gottfried Heinrici reported from the generals' camp at
Bridgend in Wales in a letter to Liddell Hart that 'half of us has already gone home'
(LHCMA, LHP 9/24/64, Heinrici to Liddell Hart, 31 Dec. 1947).
36 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/53, GCOnther Blumentritt to Liddell Hart, 25 Apr. 1947.
37 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/16, Walther Warlimont to Liddell Hart, 21 Oct. 1948, is a
typical example, beginning 'As an old and grateful student of your military writings
in pre-war times .'.
38 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/16, Frido von Senger und Etterlin to Liddell Hart, 24 Aug.
1948.
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given his standing as an opponent of Hitler's regime, not to mention
his rare intellectual detachment and objectivity (he had been a Rhodes
Scholar in Oxford before the First World War) 74 it serves to highlight
the quality of the work which Liddell Hart had produced. There is
certainly no doubt that Liddell Hart was able to retain a remarkable
degree of objectivity in assessing the German generals he met in 1945,
noting that 'Few of them resembled the typical picture of an iron Prus-
sian soldier ... Many would have looked in their natural place at any
conference of bank managers or civil engineers.'40 Nonetheless, it was
his conclusion that 'had they become philosophers they would have
ceased to be soldiers'41 which caused the most controversy.
While the book was inevitably bound to draw criticism in Britain
(which indeed it did42), in Germany the reaction was much more
favourable. Although many reviews did not appear until the German
translation of the second edition was published in 1950, nonetheless
by 1949 Liddell Hart's name and book had become well known in
Germany. And it was not only The Other Side of the Hill which attracted
attention. An article by Liddell Hart, published in the London Picture
Post on the subject of the outbreak of war in 1939, for example, was
seized upon by the daily newspaper Kieler Nachvichten. The Kiel article
in many ways sums up the significance of Liddell Hart's writings in
early postwar Germany. It pointed out that a 'renowned Englishman',
already known as an 'independent theorist' was now seeking to throw
light on the question of responsibility 'on the other side' for the out-
break of the Second World War. It also noted that he was 'well known
for his efforts for a just judgement on the German war leadership
through his book The Other Side of the Hill and also in the matter of
the Manstein Trial'. In commenting on the Picture Post article, the
newspaper concluded: 'His contribution to the truth, subjective
though it is, and though it ought not to be overrated in its effect, will
not be possible to simply push aside.'43 In other words, there was
9 For a short but authoritative biography of von Senger, see F. von Senger und
Etterlin, 'Senger', in C. Banett, ed., Hitlers Generals (London, 1989), pp. 375-92.
Senger was a Rhodes Scholar at StJohn's College, Oxford, from 1912 to 1914. He
impressed one staunch anti-Nazi who had spent the war in America as being a good
Christian and devout Catholic when he got to know him after the war (author's
interview with Dr Alexander B6ker, Munich, 12 Aug. 1996).
40 Preface to the First Edition', in Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, p. 7.
41 p. cit., p. 471.
42 Mearsheimer refers to the critical reviews in the British press (Mearsheimer, Liddell
Hart, pp. 185-7), but without noting that one of the reviewers, Robert Vansittart, was
an arch-opponent of Liddell Hart's view of leniency in handling Germany. The
review of the book certainly cannot be viewed outside the context of the debate on
postwar policy towards Germany. Liddell Hart, writing to a German general in 1949,
noted that in Britain there were 'those like Lord Vansittart [who] contend that
the Germans are inherently aggressive, and that they regard fainess as a sign of
weakness' (Institut fulr Zeitgeschichte, Munich (hereafter JfZ), NachlaB Leo Frhr.
Geyr von Schweppenburg, ED91/38, Liddell Hart to Geyr, 28 Jan. 1949).
41 'Mitschuld auf der anderen Seite. Die Ansichten Liddell Harts - die verhingnisvolle
Entwicklung zum September 1939', Kieler Nachrichtn, 3 Sept. 1949.
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clearly capital to be gained for those wishing to follow a line which
deviated from the acceptance of collective guilt for the German nation
by citing the 'objective and independent view' of Liddell Hart.
However, precisely because Liddell Hart was a welcome weapon in
the arsenal of those arguing against collective guilt and the 'guilt of
the generals', The Other Side of the Hill also came in for some harsh
criticism in Germany. One newspaper article published inJanuary 1949
in the Neae Zeitung, entitled 'The Guilt of the German Generals',44
began by informing its readers that an article bearing the title 'The
Innocence of the Generals' would probably have met with more
approval. But, after much consideration, the newspaper had decided
to continue to speak of the guilt of the generals, as 'in England a few
months ago a very dubious book appeared'. The article then moved
quickly to the offensive, levelling the accusation that the generals had
probably gone through the manuscript with the book's author. As to
Liddell Hart's conclusions that had the generals become philosophers,
they would have ceased to have been soldiers, the article retorted, 'But
that is precisely the point! Were Clausewitz and Moltke not soldiers?'
The generals were then accused of betraying their soldiers, short shrift
being given to the defence that they had sworn an oath: 'it is astonish-
ing that the generals always speak of their duty to higher authority,
but not of their duty to the soldiers entrusted to them.' The conclusion
was damning, as well as courageous:
There is much that is true in this book; no one would doubt this.
But the truth is not to be found here. The German generals dug
their own grave. They betrayed their great military tradition them-
selves. They deserve as a caste neither sympathy nor justification.
Those who want mercy should remain silent.
The article had, in effect, taken up a moral position against Liddell
Hart's book, a step seen by some as necessary due to the increasing
aggressiveness of sections of the German public towards the propa-
ganda and re-education policies being carried out by the Allied occu-
pation forces.
The imprisonment of generals, and the treatment they were receiv-
ing in captivity, was also an issue in which Liddell Hart became
involved in the late 1940s, not only endearing him to the generals but
further strengthening his reputation in Germany as a representative
44 Dr H. Lindemann, 'Die Schuld der deutschen Generale: Eine deutsche
Stellungnahme zu Liddell Harts Buch "The Other Side of the Hill"', Nene Zeitung, 29
Jan. 1949. The charge that some generals had collaborated with Liddell Hart in
preparing the manuscript of The Other Side of the Hill seems well founded. It is clear
that Kurt Dittmar, for example, produced a series of notes on one of the chapters
(LHCMA, LHP 9/24/90, Sullivan to Liddell Hart, 9 Jan. 1946)4.
War in History 1998 5 (3)
 at Univ of Salford Hold Account on January 22, 2014wih.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
338 Alaric Searle
of British 'fairness'.45 But he was not only involved in public protests
against the treatment of the imprisoned generals, he also sought to
intervene on their behalf behind the scenes. Thus it was as a result of
a conversation with Liddell Hart in the summer of 1948 that the head
of information services in the British occupation zone in Germany,
General Alexander Bishop, visited Field Marshal Albert Kesselring and
other generals at Werl prison and, having seen the poor conditions
under which they were being held, did his best to see that their situ-
ation was improved, securing - among other things - a regular supply
of British and German newspapers.46
Liddell Hart was also willing to cooperate with Panzer-General Leo
Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg in his campaign for the Waffen-SS
General Wilhelm Bittrich, who was being held in 1949 by the French
military authorities. Bittrich, who had commanded the 9th SS Panzer
Division in Normandy in 1944, had been transferred from an American
POW camp to France in January 1948 as a witness, and then had been
held in captivity on the grounds of unspecified war crimes, without
any trial date being set.47 Geyr sent Liddell Hart a copy of a letter from
Bittrich to his wife in which the general described the dismal con-
ditions in the prison. Liddell Hart replied to Geyr in May 1949 that
'he was much shocked on reading it', and he said that he was 'getting
copies typed'.48 A little over two months later Liddell Hart wrote once
again to Geyr: 'Through the Bishop of Chichester I have been able to
make contact with Pastor Boegner, the President of the French Reform
Church, who has promised to take immediate action towards easing
Bittrich's situation - through the Chaplain at Marseilles whom he
knows well . .. Liddell Harts private efforts on behalf of the Waffen-
4 Here it is worth noting the following lines from the dust-jacket description of jetzt
dilrfen sie reden: The most eminent English military writer, whose books have for
years attracted attention in Germany and have enjoyed a high reputation, has
presented with his work, ... a gift to the world, in particular to us Germans, which
does not only say to each reader something until now unknown and sensationally
new, but it has also turned out to be the fint objective assessTmet of the Genan generals in
the Second World War through a former opponent. The German generals and admirals
have reported to him, the military specialist, in private discussions how the great
struggle of the peoples took its course from their point of view, and Liddell Hart has
ealuated their stateTme ts criticaly, but with great fairness and produced an account which
is not only exciting, but equally serves the truth' (emphasis added).
46 LHCMA, Bishop Papers, Maj.-Gen. Sir Alec Bishop, 'Look Back with Pleasure',
unpublished memoirs, Jan. 1972, p. 109. Bishop's efforts were mentioned in a tone
of gratitude by Kesselring in his memoirs as being the first push which led to the
later improvement in conditions. See Generalfeldmarschall a.D. A. Kesselring, Soldat
bs zum etzen Tag (Bonn, 1953), p. 452.
17 According to a variety of postwar statements by Geyr, Bittrich was a chivalrous soldier
and, moreover, had told Geyr in 1943 that he wanted to leave the Waffen SS, but
had been informed by Himmler that he would not do so alive. See JfZ, ED91/14,
Geyr von Schweppenburg, Eidesstattliche Erklirung, 9 May 1947 and 11 Sept. 1948.
The background to the case can be found in more detail in untitled typewritten
notes by Geyr of 1952, and Geyr, 'Der letzte deutsche kommandierende General in
Frankreich', n.d. [1952].
48 IfZ, ED91/38, Liddell Hart to Geyr von Schweppenburg, 31 May 1949.
4 IfZ, ED91/38, Liddell Hart to Geyr von Schweppenburg, 4 Aug. 1949.
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SS General show the close relationship he enjoyed with some of the
generals, while Geyr, on the other hand, was quick to realize the posi-
tive value of Liddell Hart's name in connection with the later public
campaign on behalf of Bittrich.50
Liddell Hart's contact with generals became somewhat more intense
in 1948 and 1949. He corresponded with Manstein, Guderian, Man-
teuffel, Blumentritt and Geyr von Schweppenburg, to name but a few.
The correspondence was often concerned with historical questions,
but views were also exchanged on contemporary military and political
problems. Liddell Hart was certainly well informed on the situation in
Germany in the late 1940s as his son, Adrian, had taken up a post in
the Control Commission in March 1947,51 while many of his German
correspondents informed him in considerable detail of the prevailing
social and political conditions at that time.52 Particularly interesting,
however, is an early awareness of the issue of western defence against
the Russian threat. In December 1948 Liddell Hart wrote to Guinther
Blumentritt informing him that he had received two articles by the
latter which he had sent to the New English Revzew. However, the jour-
nal was unwilling to publish them: 'Since the Russians and their sym-
pathisers are talking so much about Anglo-German cooperation in
western defence measures, and spreading so many rumours about what
they imagine is being done, there is a natural unwillingness to publish
anything here that may forment their suspicions and accusations at
this ticklish time . . .'53 Considering this letter, it would seem unrealistic
to imagine Liddell Hart was not aware of the contemporary signifi-
cance of his historical publications.
During the course of 1949, he was much involved in collecting
material for the second edition of The Other Side of the Hilt This time,
the German generals were far more closely involved, particularly two
advocates of a strong military bulwark against the Russians, Guderian
and von Manteuffel. In fact, the latter clearly understood the signifi-
cance of the book for the generals and the emerging campaign for
rearmament. Writing to Liddell Hart on receipt of the first edition,
he concluded:
Your book The Other Side of the Hill really 'gripped' me in every sense
of the word. It is true to the facts. Your own conclusions are
50 Leo Frhr. Geyr von Schweppenburg, Der Fall Bittrich', Deutsche Soldatenzeitung, 1
June 1953, in which Geyr wrote that 'during the course of Bittrich's years in
captivity, old comradesin-arms had lent their support, as well as former opponents
such as Liddel[l] Hart.'
51 Bundesarchiv-MilitUrarchiv Freiburg i.Br. (hereafter BA-MA), Nachla3 Blumentritt,
N252/46, Liddell Hart to Blumentritt, 28 Mar. 1947.
52 See e.g. the correspondence from General der Artillerie Anton von Bechtolsheim on
food shortages and war crimes, LHCMA, LHP 9/24/51, von Bechtolsheim to Liddell
Hart, 6 June 1948 and 22 July 1949. On the issue of the denial of pensions to
former professional soldiers, see the letters from Geyr von Schweppenburg, LHCMA,
LHP 9/24/61, Geyr von Schweppenburg to Liddell Hart, 3 and 22 Jan. 1949.
53 BA-MA, N252/46, Liddell Hart to Blumentritt, 14 Dec. 1948.
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especially good and correct. I will shortly write to you on this subject.
Outing to zts mportance will you please acknowledge receipt of sletterh54
In the light of Manteuffel's letter it is perhaps not surprising that, while
the revised and enlarged second edition of the book first appeared in
Britain in 1951, the German translation of the second edition, jeat
darfen sze reden, was published the year before. Indeed, the book took
on almost a life of its own in Germany. As not many memoirs had yet
appeared, it was the first opportunity for many Germans to discover
more about the war from the perspective of their own commanders.55
Indeed, the book's significance at the time of the outbreak of the
Korean War can be best illustrated by an anecdote. A young German
with aspirations to enter the diplomatic service, who had begun work-
ing in the Bundeskanzleramt (Chancellor's Office) in 1949, was sent by
Adenauer to sound out discreetly the Socialist leader, Kurt Schum-
acher, on security questions shortly after the North Korean attack in
June 1950. The young intimate of Adenauer found Schumacher to be
remarkably well-informed on military questions, and to his surprise saw
a pile of military books and biographies on his desk - among them a
copy of Liddell Hart's The Other Side of the Hilt56
West German Rearmament, 1950-1953
By 1950 the question of West German rearmament was becoming a
major issue in Britain, but Liddell Hart had already devoted consider-
able thought to the issue. The issue had not featured greatly in his
correspondence with Wehrmacht generals prior to the Korean War,
largely because it was highly sensitive, and the generals knew prema-
ture discussions could lead to adverse publicity; what was more, the
Allied military authorities opened and read mail throughout their
54 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/16, von Manteuffel to Liddell Hart, 9 Jan. 1949; emphasis
added.
55 In a review essay on memoirs by former military commanders in the foreign policyjournal Aussenpolitik one writer even went so far as to assert: 'Without the book by
the Englishman Liddle [sic] Hart, The Other Side of the Hih which has also appeared
in German translation, the German people would have, until yesterday, remained in
the dark as to the plans and intentions, the deeds, the performance of its military
leadership in the Second World War' (HG.. von Studnitz, Bficher vom Kriege',
Ausenpolitk: Zeitschrft fur inernationaleEragen III (June 1952), p. 405). See also
comments to the same effect in C. Kobe, We die BundesweAr entstand. Erlebnie mit
dem Konzpt der Ausbildung (Osnabrfck, 1985), pp. 19 f
56 Transcript of author's interview with Dr A. B6ker, Munich, 21 Aug. 1995, p. 16, and,
for the dating of the meeting, author's interview with Dr B6ker, Munich, 12 Aug.
1996. For the concern which the North Korean attack caused the Chancellor, hence
making more comprehensible his step in contacting his otherwise arch-rival,
Schumacher, see K. Adenauer, Erinnwrtrgen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 346-9.
War in History 1998 5 (3)
 at Univ of Salford Hold Account on January 22, 2014wih.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953 341
three occupation zones.57 Nonetheless, in 1948 he had already reached
the conclusion that Europe was facing a grave danger, posed by the
military might of the Soviet Union and the totalitarian nature of com-
munism, and he had begun to take an interest in the tactical, technical
and strategic aspects of the problem.58 In July of that year he had
expressed the view in an article in Picture Post that a Western Union,
to be constructed for the defence of Europe against the Soviet Union,
would only be viable if the Germans were 'allowed to share in its
defence'.59 In early 1950 - in other words, before the Korean War had
started - he began to concentrate on the military issues of German
rearmament.60 Among the questions which were occupying him were
the nature of the German views on the military situation, and of the
'balance of opinion about the question of rearming and about the
form of it'.61
In order to obtain more first-hand information, he set about organiz-
ing a trip to the Continent for June and part of July, and on this trip
he made a point of meeting as many German generals as he could.
On 21 June he saw Speidel, on 24 June, Geyr von Schweppenburg, on
26June, Guderian and von Senger und Etterlin, on 28 and 29 June,
Halder, Greiffenberg, Miller-Hillebrand, Bayerlein and Blumentritt,
while 2 and 3 July were occupied with dinner engagements, first alone
with Manteuffel and on the following day with Manteuffel and
Westphal together.62 At his meeting with Lieutenant-General (rtd)
Hans Speidel on 21 June, he discovered that Rommel's former chief
of staff was wholeheartedly in favour of rearmament and believed most
Germans felt the same way,63 a view more or less diametrically opposed
to the one offered by Geyr von Schweppenburg, whom he visited at
his home near Munich on 24 June.64 On 28 and 29 June Liddell Hart
visited Halder, Greiffenberg and Mulller-Hillebrand at the American
Army Historical Division at Kbnigstein, near Frankfurt. He gave his
own presentation to a group of former officers there, during which he
17 For the m onitoring of mail, see K. H6fner, Die Aufrastung Westdeutschlands:
WH/cmbildung Entscheidungsprozesse und Spielrdume westdeutscher Poliik 1945 bis 1950
(Munich, 1990), pp. 51-4. Obviously these security measures did not leave former
Wehrmacht generals unaffected. General der Panzertruppe a.D. Hasso von
Manteuffel, in a letter to Liddell Hart in April 1950, commented in a matter-of-fact
tone, 'my mail is now being checked again by the British occupation authorities'
(LHCMA, LHP 9/24/72, von Manteuffel to Liddell Hart, 27 Apr. 1950).
8 See e.g. the following memoranda in LHCMA, LHP, 11/1948/6, B.H.L.H., The
European situation - deeper currents, 7 Mar. 1948; 11/1948/19, B.H.L.H., Notes on
the Russian forces (and those that could oppose them), July 1948; 11/1948/7, Notes
for History. Talk with Martel. A. The present situation, 29 Mar. 1948.
59 B.H. Liddell Hart, Will There Be War?', Picture Post, 24 July 1948.
60 LHCMA, LHP 11/1950/3, [B.H.L.H.] Note for History- 1 Feb. 1950. German
Rearmament.
61 LHCMA, LHP 11/1950/22: [B.H.L.H.] The European problem, n.d. [1950].
62 LHCMA, LHP 11/1950/1B, Liddell Hart's continental tour, 1950.
63 LHCMA, LHP 11/1950/15, Speidel. Freudenstadt. 21 June 1950 [notes on
conversation].
64 LHCMA, LHP 11/1950/15, Geyr von Schweppenburg. Ebenhausen. 24 June 1950
[notes on conversation].
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told his German audience that although neither East nor West desired
war, Korea had increased the danger of conflict considerably.65 Halder,
for his part, was pessimistic on the chances for rearmament, politically,
domestically and internationally. He suggested Germany should have
a gendarmerie powerful enough to protect the country from the police
force-type formations being equipped in the Soviet occupation zone,
but not strong enough for serious offensive operations. Interestingly,
Halder was also afraid of the East German press accusing him of con-
spiring to revive the military, and gave Liddell Hart strict instructions
that none of his opinions be attributed to him directly by name.66 At
the end of the German leg of his tour, Liddell Hart dined twice with
Manteuffel and his wife at the latter's home in Neuss, near Dtisseldorf,
where they 'talked at length about current problems'.67
Liddell Hart's interest in rearmament appears to have been awak-
ened by his European trip. Not long after returning, he requested lists
of the most likely candidates for high command in future Federal Ger-
man armed forces, writing in turn to Blumentritt and Lieutenant-Gen-
eral (rtd) Kurt Dittmar. At this point the desire of the former generals
to maintain a united front when communicating with Liddell Hart
becomes more apparent. On 24 October Dittmar replied to questions
on 'personalities' from Liddell Hart in detail, but made sure he sent
a copy of his letter to Blumentritt. His candidates for the C-in-C were
Manteuffel, Guderian, Kesselring and perhaps Speidel, and for Chief
of the General Staff, Heusinger, Speidel, Lossberg or Brennecke. He
was particularly enthusiastic in his praise for Heusinger.68 Blumentritt
wrote first to Speidel on 9 September before replying to a request for
details on the most capable officers. Speidel, who in many ways had
taken on the role of an unofficial CGS among former generals, advised
Blumentritt to mention only those generals who were generally accept-
able to former colleagues.69 Blumentritt then sent a memorandum to
Liddell Hart in which he saw the most promising C-in-Cs as von
Manstein, von Manteuffel or Guderian, and the most capable general
staff officers as Heusinger, Speidel and Westphal; he also mentioned
Joppe, Dittmar, Brennecke and Rdttiger as being particularly tal-
ented.70 Speidel also replied to a request by Liddell Hart for sugges-
tions on possible candidates for the top positions in a new German
army, naming Heusinger, Foertsch, von Manteuffel, Blumentritt and
Brennecke, for the Luftwaffe, Meister and Seidemann, and for the
65 N. Wiggershaus, 'Die Entscheidung far einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag
1950', in MGFA, ed., Anfange westdeutscher Sicherheitspoliik 1945-1956 i, p. 343.
66 LHCMA, LHP 11/1950/15, Halder. Kbnigstein. 29 June 1950 (notes on
conversation).
67 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/72, Liddell Hart to von Manteuffel, 16 Aug. 1950.
68 BA-MA, N252/4, Dittmar to Liddell Hart, 24 Oct. 1950.
69 BA-MA, N252/19, Speidel to Blumentritt, 18 Sept. 1950.
70 LHCMA, LHP, 9/24/93, Blumentritt to Liddell Hart, 19 Sept. 1950, enclosing
untitled memorandum of 19 Sept. 1950.
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navy, Heye, Ruge and Wagner.71 Naturally, we can only speculate as to
the motivation which lay behind Liddell Hart's strong interest in these
questions. However, it may well have been that the English writer was
trying to return to his success formula from the 1930s in Britain, a time
during which he had enjoyed considerable influence among British
politicians because of his inside knowledge of military affairs and per-
sonalities.72
Significantly, Liddell Hart's interest in West German rearmament
was not restricted to private conversations. Already in July 1950,
although it did not deal directly with German rearmament, an article
of his examining the military capabilities and strength of western Euro-
pean armies had been published in the West German journal Aussenpo-
litik, later to become the country's leading foreign policy journal.73
Then, in October 1950, a newspaper article by him discussing the pros
and cons of rearmament was published in the Oberhesszsche Zeitung
under the title 'Soll Deutschland mitLimpfen?' (Should Germany fight
as well?). Opening with the assertion that the defence of western Eur-
ope would only be possible with German help, Liddell Hart summar-
ized the impressions he had gathered during his trip to Germany in
the summer of that year. Noting the effects of Allied occupation meas-
ures, he described the anti-militarism of the younger generation and
the attitude of politicians and former soldiers. While he acknowledged
that the negative attitudes towards rearmament in West Germany were
understandable, he remarked that the impact of the attack on South
Korea, which had taken place during his visit to Germany, had been
clearly discernible: 'One quickly concluded that the same thing could
happen to Germany.' And, in the concluding paragraph he made it
clear that he was a firm supporter of rearmament, writing: 'It would
probably present no great difficulties to find enough volunteers with
wartime experience to form 10 to 20 divisions.' The real problem
would be to provide the equipment necessary for such divisions. To
overcome this difficulty during the first phase of rearmament, he sug-
gested 'the formation of a small "international army" or "European
Legion" ... in which volunteers from all western countries, including
Germans, could enter with the same rights'. 74
Liddell Hart's advocacy of a German defence contribution, with
equal rights, went much further than many in Britain were willing to
71 LHCMA, LHP, 9/24/80, Speidel to Liddell Hart, 27 Sept. 1950.
72 Evidence of Liddell Hart's influence in personnel questions in the British army can
be gleaned from his memoirs. See The Memoirn of Captain Liddel Hart (London,
1965), esp. vol. ii, pp. 1-124. His influence in personnel matters in the 1930s has
also been noted by historians: H. Winton, To CAnge an Army: CEeeral SirJohn Burnet-
Stuart and British Armoured Doctine4 1927-1938 (London, 1988), pp. 192-200; Bond,
Liddell Hay4 pp. 88 f
7' B.H. Liddell Hart, Zur militUrischen Weltlage', Aussenpolitk: ZeitscArftffir
internationale Fragen I 1( 950), pp. 88-95.
7' Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, Soll Deutschland mitkimpfen? Vorteile und Nachteile auf
callierte Waage", Oberhessische Zeitung, 18 Oct. 1950.
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countenance in 1950, even after the North Korean attack in June.
Moreover, his support for German participation 'with the same rights'
mirrored the wishes of some of the German generals who had first
advocated German involvement in the defence of western Europe.75
Particularly interesting is Liddell Hart's mention of the bitter feelings
among ex-soldiers concerning the trials conducted against former gen-
erals, and most notably against Field Marshal von Manstein.76 For for-
mer generals and army officers, the Allies' war crimes trials were seen
as 'victor's justice', and among the circle of former generals and gen-
eral staff officers around Hans Speidel who were attempting to work
with the Allies and German politicians towards achieving a public and
political consensus on rearmament, reaching 'a solution' on the ques-
tion of imprisoned former high-ranking officers was seen as a prerequi-
site for rearmament. Liddell Hart was well aware of this problem, and
during the course of 1951 he was especially active in putting his weight
behind the campaign for the release of Manstein. Liddell Hart must
have been in no doubt as to the importance attached to the issue of
perceived miscarriages ofjustice, since it featured strongly in his corre-
spondence with former generals in 195 1.77 He did his best to under-
take a press campaign in support of Manstein, and a letter in support
of the Field Marshal was published in The Times on 11 January 1950 in
reaction to the 18-year sentence passed on Manstein in December the
previous year.78 His support for imprisoned generals was greeted
warmly by those generals who were working to achieve agreement with
the Allies on the issue, and Speidel wrote to Liddell Hart in April 1951
thanking him for his efforts, but underlining the importance of
the matter for the rearmament cause, especially its psychological
dimensions.
However, Lid dell Hart's campaign in the press against 'victor's jus-
t One of the first generals to advocate equal rights for Germany in the defence of
western Europe was Hasso von Manteuffel. In a memorandum of 7 May 1950, he
called for equal diplomatic status for Germany, for freedom of the seas for German
ships and for an end to the defamation of German soldiers by the Allies. Moreover,
he was blunt in his call for purely Germ an formations, answerable to a sovereign
German state. See BA-MA, Nachlal3 von Manteuffel, N617/18, Hasso von Manteuffel,
'Muss Krieg kommen?', TS, 7 May 1950. Manteuffel expressed the same ideas in a
newspaper interview a few months later: 'Es ist funf Minuten vor zw6lf. Der frOhere
General von Manteuffel flber eine Wiederaufrfistung Westdeutschlands', NeuA
Gretnbromicr Zeitung, 14 Aug.1950. Liddell Hart got on particularly well with von
Manteuffel (notes on author's interview with Gerd von Manteuffel, Munich, 15 July
1993, p. 2), and it is possible he may have been influenced by the General on this
point when they met on 2-3 July.
76 Liddell Hart, Soll Deutschland mitkAampfen?: with the trial against the Field Marshal
von Manstein a turning point on sensitivities is threatening. The stubbornness with
which the Allies insist in keeping German officers in prison for actions which they
had to carry out, by necessity, against communist partisans, has become the central
point of the complaints [in Germany].'
77 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/72, von Manteuffel to Liddell Hart, 18 Apr. 1951, -mentioning in
particular the cases of Falkenhausen and Ramcke.
7' For Liddell Hart's arguments against the war crimes trials, see the treatment in
Bond, Liddel Ha4 pp. 180-88.
79 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/80, Speidel to Liddell Hart, 10 Apr. 1951.
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tice' was not restricted to the imprisoned generals. In September 1951
he provoked considerable correspondence on the issue of the 'honour
of the German soldier' in the columns of The Times through a letter
he wrote replying to an editorial in which it had been stated that 'out-
side Africa, the German Army earned a terrible reputation which can-
not be wiped out by a simple declaration or by releasing persons justly
condemned'.80 Liddell Hart's letter is interesting for, in addition to
employing the argument that the Allies had also committed war
crimes, he made a direct link between the necessity of revising sen-
tences on generals and the sensibilities of ex-servicemen in Germany.
He concluded his letter by arguing: 'Some of the foremost generals
now in prison are regarded with deep respect and affection by the
"great majority" of decent soldiers, who believe them to have been
unjustly sentenced. To continue keeping them imprisoned without
chance of retrial under fairer conditions will be a festering sore and
is bound to bring serious trouble.'81 In other words, Liddell Hart's
objection to the attack on the honour of the German soldier was less
concerned with philosophical, moral or historical details than with the
damaging effect of lack of movement on the issue on public opinion
in Germany vis-d-vis rearmament.
The effect of the war crime sentences on former soldiers and their
willingness to participate in Western defence efforts was also men-
tioned in a book by Liddell Hart, Gedanken zur Verteidigng Europas
(Thoughts on the defence of Europe), which was published in German
in 1951. In this little-known work, which appears to have been written
specifically for publication in the German language, he made a careful
study of the state of the West's defences and the various arguments of
the Allies against rearming Germany. However, he did not shy away
from criticizing the lack of concern for Germany's security on the part
of the Western allies, and while outlining the fears of German poli-
ticians and the population in general of a re-establishment of the mili-
tary, he presented the differing views of Halder, Manteuffel and Blu-
mentritt on rearmament. Halder, whom he did not mention by name,
had put forward the idea of a gendarmerie to protect against a surprise
attack by East German paramilitary formations. Manteuffel sought 30
well-equipped divisions, while Blumentritt saw the answer to the prob-
lem in a volunteer army.82 Liddell Hart's book was a clever piece of
pro-rearmament publicity in which he was able to lend his support to
80 Editorial: German Opinion', The Times, 19 Sept. 1951.
s1 B.H. Liddell Hart, letter to The Times, 22 Sept. 1951.
82 B.H. Liddell Hart, Gedarken zur Veteidigrng Eumpas (Coburg, 1951), esp. pp. 48-50.
The ideas for a gendarmerie, credited by Liddell Hart to 'a former Chief of the
General Staff, can be definitively ascribed to Halder when one consults Liddell
Hart's notes on his conversation with the former in 1950, to be found at LHCMA,
LHP 11/1950/15, Halder, K6nigstein, 29 June 1950. The book is not based on any
sections of Liddell Hart's 1950 work, Defence of the West, and the copyright references
to the English original contain no details of publication elsewhere. Neither Bond
nor Mearsheimer has made any reference to the book in their monographs on
Liddell Hart.
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former generals. Moreover, his name was also used in support of the
rearmament campaign in an important work also published in 1951
under the title Armee ohne Pathos (Army without pathos), in which the
views of many former generals were laid out in considerable detail.
Liddell Hart was cited on several occasions, appearing once again in
the guise of the objective, independent commentator from abroad.83
The year 1952 saw Liddell Hart continue his efforts in the press and
behind the scenes on behalf of the generals still held in prison. The
fact that he was received by the German Chancellor, Konrad Aden-
auer, on 9 June of that year gives some indication of how significant
his role and influence had become in the public and political debate
on the question in both Britain and Germany. While his audience with
Adenauer was just one appointment during this particular trip to the
Continent, it was certainly his most important. Here, it is interesting
to compare Liddell Hart's hastilyjotted questions, of which there were
eight, with his notes on the meeting itself. While his eight questions
ranged from Russian policy to when the new divisions were to be ready,
with only two questions on the imprisoned generals,84 at his 'confiden-
tial, background talk' with the Chancellor, the question of the release
of the generals appears to have been the main subject under dis-
cussion. During the conversation, which lasted just under an hour,
Adenauer pointed out that the lack of progress on the problem was
complicating the ratification of the European Treaty. The Chancellor
also stated that he did not favour a general amnesty, but he thought
it important that generals such as Kesselring be released in order to
'take the wind out of the sails of the rising public clamour and make
it easier to resist the demand that everyone convicted of war crimes
should be released'. And he mentioned that, while the plans to form
a German contingent had been planned to coincide with the ratifi-
cation of the European Treaty, the continued imprisonment of Kessel-
ring and Manstein would create recruitment problems.85
The following day Liddell Hart wrote to Lord Hankey, outlining the
main points made by Adenauer during the interview,86 and on his
8 A. Weinstein, Armee oAne Pathos: Die deutsche Wiederbewaffnung im Until ehemaliger
Soldaen (Bonn, 1951), with references to Liddell Hart on pp. 45, 116 f., 130f. It is
interesting to note that on pp. 130 f£, a quote from Liddell Hart's Defence of the West
is used to support the opinion of General der Kavallerie a.D. Siegfried Westphal that
Ievery idea must proceed from the assumption that a defence has to be formed
against red division[s] ... the structure, armament and the size of tactical and
operational formations [cannot be conducted according to] ... the wishes of
politicians who have to take account of their voters'.
84 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/48, untitled typewritten note of 8 questions, headed 9 June
1952, Bonn.
85 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/48, B.H.L.H., Note on talk with the German Chancellor (Dr
Adenauer) at the Palais Schaumburg, Bonn, 9 June 1952, n.d. The Chancellor's
record of the meeting is much more detailed, and can be consulted in Rudolf
Morsey and HansPeter Schwarz, eds, Adenauer Teegespr&che 1950-1954 (Rh6ndorf,
1984), no. 32, 9 June 1952: Unterredung (Aufzeichnung vom lI Juni 1952),
pp. 315-20.
86 Public Record Office, Kew, F0371 /97979, Liddell Hart to Hankey, 10 June 1952.
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return to Britain he set about trying to whip up support for an early
release of some of the generals. During the course of a visit to London
from 1 to 3 July, he discovered that unwillingness to take any swift
steps was based on a fear that an outcry might ensure in France which
could lead to the treaty ratification being endangered. He brought up
the matter with Reginald Paget, who promised to take it up with Chur-
chill and also mentioned that the government was trying to find a pre-
text to release Manstein. Liddell Hart also talked at length with Field
Marshal Alexander about the Manstein case.Y7 He then communicated
the results of his discussions to Adenauer in a letter of 5 July, to which
the German Chancellor replied about one week later, thanking Liddell
Hart for his efforts and asking him to keep up his interest in the
matter.88
However, Liddell Hart's 1952 'continental tour' had equally been
conducted to allow him the opportunity to examine the state of the
West's defences. Summarizing his impressions from his June visit in a
memorandum, Liddell Hart concluded that the chance of a Russian
surprise attack had receded considerably during the course of 1952,
but that if an attack were to take place, the lack of reserves could prove
fatal to the West. This was one of the reasons why he remained con-
vinced of the absolute necessity of German divisions being created. He
phrased the issue succinctly in a single sentence: 'In the argument
over German rearmament, the compelling reasons for it have not been
brought out clearly - i.e. That the minimum reinforcement required
to maintain a prolonged defence can only be provided by tapping a
fresh source, and that Western Germany is the only possible source.'
However, he could only lament the fact that the 12 German divisions
which he thought might allow a defence in front of the Rhine would
not be ready until the end of 1954.89 Thus, once again, Liddell Hart
emerges as an unwavering supporter of West German rearmament as
a ml itary necessity.
In January the following year, the great efforts made by Liddell Hart
and, from among the ranks of the German generals, above all Hans
Speidel, finally began to come to fruition. In summarizing the situation
in a letter to Liddell Hart, Speidel noted that the news of the release
of Kesselring and von Mackensen had been greeted with delight in
Germany. He also expressed the wish that Manstein's period of
recuperation in a clinic in Kiel would be extended by the British auth-
orities.90 While Speidel continued to keep up the pressure on the Brit-
87 LHCMA, LHP 11/1952/9, B.H.L.H., Notes on London visit 1-3 July 1952, n.d.
88 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/48, Liddell Hart to Adenauer, 5 July 1952, and Adenauer to
Liddell Hart, 16 July 1952.
89 LHCMA, LHP 11/1 952/ 1, B.H.L.H., Impressions from my Continental Tour, July
1952, pp. 1-3.
90 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/80, Speidel to Liddell Hart, 15 Jan. 1953. Manteuffel also wrote
to Liddell Hart in the same month, thanking him for his efforts on behalf of the
German soldiers and noting that they had 'found great recognition on behalf of the
soldiers here - unfortunately, we cannot thank you enough for thisU' (LHCMA, LHP
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ish authorities for the release of Falkenhorst in the first part of the
year, the problem, in terms of the rearmament campaign, had to all
intents and purposes been solved.
January 1953 saw further recognition in Germany of Liddell Hart as
an outstanding military authority when his picture appeared on the
front cover of the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel. The magazine not
only published an article by Liddell Hart, 'Wenn ich russischer Gen-
eralstabchef ware' (If I were the Russian Chief of Staff),91 but also fea-
tured an in-depth article examining his career, most notably his post-
war involvement with Wehrmacht generals. As well as repeating Liddell
Hart's hobby horse that Guderian had been his pupil in questions of
tank warfare before the Second World War, and describing the back-
ground to the writing of The Other Side of the Hill, the article gave con-
siderable space to his theories concerning the defence of Western Eur-
ope which were, it was noted, 'largely based on the experiences of
German generals'.92 Despite the sarcastic tone for which Der Spzegel has
become renowned, the attention devoted to Liddell Hart's assessment
of German military problems, in addition to the praise for his military-
historical writing, makes clear that his reputation had reached a peak
in Germany.93
Although Liddell Hart conducted two more of his famed 'continen-
tal tours' before the swearing-in of the first Bundeswehr recruits - first
in mid-1953 and then subsequently in the autumn of 19559' - by the
end of 1953 he had become less involved in the German rearmament
question. Although the negotiating process was by no means over for
the new democratic republic, internationally or domestically, with the
disappearance of the war criminals issue, Liddell Hart's influence
began to wane. Nonetheless, it must have been satisfying for him to
have been invited to a semi-official dinner discussion for members of
the Bundestag Defence Committee in mid-November 1955 which was
held during the course of a 10-day visit they were making to Britain.
9/24/72, von Manteuffel to Liddell Hart, 2 Jan. 1953).91 [B.H.] Liddell Hart, 'Wenn ich russischer Generalstabschef waire', Spiege l4 Jan.
1953, pp. 26 f. With minor additions, an English version of the article can be read in
B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defence: A Fresh Look at the West's Milita?y Position
(London, 1960), pp. 3-16.
92 'Militlikritik. Liddell Hart: Ein Pfund Infanterie', Spiegel 14 Jan. 1953, pp. 22-5.
9 Liddell Hart was seen notably among former soldiers as a military historian of the
highest order, and this led to pieces by him appearing in pages normally reserved
for German writers (e.g. 'Rommel's letzter Schlag', Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung
II (May1953), p. 16). He was also frequently cited - e.g. in Generalmajor a.D. Hans
Rumpf, 'Luftkrieg fber Deutschland', in Bilanz des zweiten Weltkrieges: Erkentnie und
Verpfich,tungfr die Zukunft (Oldenbourg, 1953), pp. 173f.; Kesselring, Soldat bis zum
letzten Tag pp. 455f. The Deutsche Soldatn-Zeitung, referenced immediately above,
changed its title to Soldat im Volk, and should not be confused with the newspaper of
the same name cited in n. 50 above.
94 LHCMA, LHP 11/1953/3, B.H.L.H., Impressions of 1953 Continental Tour, 18 Aug.
1953, and LHP 11/1955/7, B.H.L.H., Conclusions from Continental Tour, 1955, Oct.
1955. The brevity of Liddell Hart's notes on these 2 visits implies that he had largely
lost interest in the contemporary military debate in West Germany.
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The group, which consisted of Dr Richard Jager (CSU), Fritz Erler
(SPD), Rear-Admiral (rtd) Hellmuth Heye (CDU), Georg Kiesling
(CDU), Panzer-General (rtd) Hasso von Manteuffel (FDP) and Helmut
Schmidt (SPD), were particularly interested in informing themselves
of British practice in parliamentary control of the armed forces.95 With
the foundation of the Bundeswehr by this time having been secured
internationally and in the West German parliament, it must have been
a poignant moment for Liddell Hart.
The Generals' View of Liddell Hart
So far, the role of Liddell Hart in the defence of the German generals
and the clear interaction between his historical treatment of the war
and the rearmament debate has been documented. Liddell Hart's
motives in cooperating closely with former Wehrmacht generals can
be ascribed to a combination of his desire for 'fair play', the wish to
have his version of the development of German armoured forces sup-
ported by the generals and a belief in the necessity of West German
rearmament. However, the question of the motives of the generals in
this very special relationship remains: to what extent were they simply
interested in assisting Liddell Hart with his 'historical research'; and
were they anxious to manipulate Liddell Hart for their own purposes
in the rearmament debate? However, before examining the attitudes
of the generals towards Liddell Hart, it is first necessary to provide
some indication of the level of involvement of former Wehrmacht gen-
erals in the preparatory thinking on rearmament on the eve of Liddell
Hart's continental tour in the summer of 1950.
As a result of Allied denazification measures, many generals in 1950
were simply struggling to find their way back into civilian life and,
apart from supporting the campaign for their pension rights, had not
involved themselves in the rearmament issue beyond discussion circles
in public houses.96 Nonetheless, a small group of generals who had
formed round the former Lieutenant-General Hans Speidel during the
course of 1949 had begun to consider the possibility of organizing
themselves to create the right climate for a rebirth of the German
military. In fact, Speidel had already produced memoranda in 1948
and 1949 on West Germany's future security, as had Geyr von Schwepp-
9 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/88, Alec Bishop to Liddell Hart, 3 Nov. 1955, Liddell Hart to
Hans von Herwarth (German embassy, London), 6 Nov. 1955, and, Liddell Hart to
L.F. Behrens, 21 Nov. 1955.
96 For the situation of demobilized German soldiers in the years immediately following
the Second World War, see C. Meyer, 'Soldaten ohne Armee: Berufssoldaten im
Kampf um Standsehre und Versorgung', in M. Broszat, K.-D. Henke and H. Woller,
eds, Von Stalingrad zur WArungsrefour: Zur SozialgescAichte des Umbrtchs in Deutschland
(Munich, 1988), pp.683-750; and Zur Situation der deutschen militTrischen
Ffihngsschicht im Vorfeld des westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrages 1945-
1950/51', in MGFA, ed., Anfdnge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956 i, pp. 635-
52.
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enburgf" so what had emerged by 1950 was an informal circle of for-
mer high-ranking officers who were anxious to engage in a campaign
for rearmament measures and also to secure a better deal for Germany
at the negotiating table. Thus, although Adenauer announced the
appointment of a personal adviser in security questions in mid-1950,
the former Panzer-General Gerhard Graf von Schwerin,98 there were
very few bureaucratic structures in place to deal with military questions
at this time. Hence, it was not surprising that a loose grouping of offi-
cers had emerged, at times cooperating, at times acting independently,
who saw it as their duty to involve themselves in the rearmament
debate, their participation by necessity leading to the emergence of
certain generals as the chief representatives of the former officer
corps.99
On the eve of Liddell Hart's visit to the Continent in 1950, many
former officers in Germany were clearly curious as to what his view of
the situation was and to what extent he could be employed in the
rearmament debate. One of Guinther Blumentritt's correspondents
asked on 6 July, 'Does Liddell Hart see the situation as it is, and can
he tell the [important] people something which will wake them up a
bit?'100 The conviction of generals and former professional soldiers
that rearmament was an urgent necessity, a view based on varying
motives and varying degrees of political and military insight, came to
be shared by an increasing number of individuals in the wake of the
Korean War, and Liddell Hart came to be seen as an important sup-
porter of the rearmament campaign. Speidel, for one, seemed to
regard the Englishman's visit in 1950 as noteworthy, writing to Blumen-
tritt as follows: 'We were able to discuss well questions of a military-
historical, contemporary and future nature. The visit was pleasing in
97 Speidel's memoranda are reproduced in his memoirs, Am umerer Zeit. Erinnerungen
(Berlin, 1977), pp. 454-96. Memoranda by Geyr von Schweppenburg can be found at
IfZ, NachlaB Dr Dirk Forster, ED 134/19, in particular the untitled document of 7
Sept. 1949. For the background to the writing of Speidel and Geyr's memoranda for
the Friedensbflro in 1948 and 1949, see R.G. Foerster, Innenpolitische Aspekte der
Sicherheit Westdeutschlands (1949-1950)', in MGFA, ed., Anfdnge westdeutschcr
Sicherheitspolitk 1945-1956 i, pp. 407-17.
9 For the announcement of Schwerin's appointment, see IfZ, NachlalGerhard Craf
von Schwerin, ED337/62, 'Militlrische Berater Adenauers: Der ehemalige General
Graf von Schwerin als Sicherheitsexperte', Windhund, Aug./Sept. 1950, p. 1. On
Schwerin's role as security adviser to Adenauer, see D. Krfger, Das Amt Blank: Die
schwierige Grnndung des Bundesmin.serium far Verteidigung (Freiburg i.Br., 1993),
pp. 17-28; Foerster, JInnenpolitische Aspekte', pp. 456-82.
99 The acceptance by former high-ranking officers of the necessity of a 'commanding
group' of former generals representing their interests, with Speidel and Heusinger at
its head, can be seen in a letter from Alfred Toppe to Blumentritt: 'Our duty is, in
my opinion, to produce a clear and unbiased assessment of the situation in terms of
its precise military aspects. This can only be done by people of the calibre of
Speidel, Brennecke, Heusinger, Blumentritt, who can guarantee objectivity. Other
"pleasant" and "additional" personalities - regardless of how great their merits and
qualifications are - cannot be trusted with specialized General Staff work' (BA-MA,
N252/17, Toppe to Blumentritt, 9 Sept. 1950).
100 BA-MA, N252/16, Wilhelm Schramm to Blumentritt, 6 July 1950.
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every respect.'10 Speidel was not the only one who wrote to Blumen-
tritt to report on his talk with Liddell Hart. Major-General (rtd) Alfred
Toppe, employed at the time at the US Army Historical Division in
Kbnigstein, near Frankfurt/Main, wrote that he had 'spoken to Liddell
Hart himself. We talked in private about problems which concern my
previous business. He asked me whether he could send me some writ-
ten questions on this area to which I could give an opinion as an
expert. Where I can be of service I will naturally do so with pleasure.'102
While there is a danger of overinterpreting statements such as this, it
would appear, if one is prepared to read between the lines, that the
generals and publicists who supported rearmament had clear plans as
to how they could make use of Liddell Hart in their campaign not
only for rearmament but also for their own rehabilitation.103
On the other hand, one should not assume that Liddell Hart was
somehow 'duped' into lending the generals support without realizing
how his name was being used in Germany. Indeed, he did his best not
only assisting some generals in publishing their memoris but also in
the correction of their manuscripts. An interesting example of this lat-
ter form of 'support' can be seen in his comments on the manuscript
of Guinther Blumentritt's biography of Field Marshal von Rundstedt.
Blumentritt's biography would appear to have been written with the
propagandistic intention of generating 'understanding' for Rund-
stedt's 'apolitical' stance during the Second World War,04 and Liddell
Hart's notes on the manuscript for the London publisher confirm this
initial impression. Liddell Hart began by commenting, 'Von Rund-
stedt's own Foreword is excellent in tone until the last sentence, which,
to judge from reactions of several people to whom I have shown it, is
likely to foster prejudice in the minds of reviewers and readers.'105 It
is not clear whether amendments were made here, but when the book
was published in 1952, the offending sentence may well have been the
one which read, 'this book, in accordance with the express intention
101 BA-MA, N252/19, Speidel to Blumentritt, 27June 1950.
102 BA-MA, N252/17, Toppe to Blumentritt, 26 July 1950.
103 For evidence to support this thesis, see BA-MA, N252/10, Schramm to Blumentritt,
29 Aug. 1950, in which Schramm discusses writing a feature on Liddell Hart for the
Munich daily newspaper Mitnchner Merkur.
104 Rundstedt had been asked by the British to write his memoirs while he was still a
POW, but had consistently refused. The British authorities had then approached
Oberst a.D. Dr Kurt Hesse, who had in turn written to Blumentritt, the former
suggesting that Desmond Young's Rommel biography ought to be supplemented
with a biography of the venerable Field Marshal. See BA-MA, N252/2, Blumentritt
(in English) to an unidentified 'Major', 13 Sept. 1950, and N252/8, Hesse to
Blumentritt, 31 Mar. 1950. In fact, the Rommel biography provoked from a member
of the Rundstedt family the comment that 'the propaganda has turned around
completely and Young's Rommel book has received an excellent press' (BA-MA,
N252/15, Dr Edith von Rundstedt to Blumentritt, 14 Aug. 1950), highlighting the
suspicion that Blumentritt's biography was written with the sole intention of
influencing public perceptions in Britain of German generals and the German army.
105 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/93, B.H.L.H., Comments on General Blumentritt's book on Wvon
Rundstedt', 11 May 1952, p. 1.
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of that of the author, contains no reproach against any nation or parti-
cular individual, because we must learn by experience that destiny is
mightier than man.'106 By this time, the notion of 'destiny' having
somehow overtaken the surprised generals had become a familiar argu-
ment in countless memoranda and memoirs written by German gen-
erals, allowing them, of course, to escape from accounting for their
actions. Likewise, while Liddell Hart's comment that two sentences
referring to von Rundstedt's 'action in executing von Papen's orders
to evict the Prussian ministers from office' in 1932 were too vague -
in fact, he recommended that his 'action here could be justified by his
duty to obey the Chancellor's orders'107 - was ignored by Blumen-
tritt,°8 it shows Liddell Hart's awareness of the problems involved in
marketing an uncritical version of the military's stance during the
National Socialist era.
The help Liddell Hart offered to German generals also included
other forms of support, for instance sending Generals Guinther Blu-
mentritt and Kurt von Tippelskirch character references.109 He also
made enquiries on behalf of a Major Busch in an attempt to secure
him a position in the so-called Amt Blank, or Blank Office, the forerun-
ner of the Federal Ministry of Defence.11 Indeed, by 1952 Liddell
Hart's connections with former generals were so well developed that
Lieutenant-General (rtd) Fritz Bayerlein wrote to him asking for advice
on how he could combat rumours which were being spread about con-
cerning his behaviour in POW camp, and which he feared might be
damaging his chances of a return to service.11 One can speculate that,
106
. Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man (London, 1952), p. 10.
107 LHCMA, LHP 9/24/93, B.H.L.H., Comments on General Blumentritt's book, p. 1.
108 In 1932 a state of emergency was proclaimed by the government (under von Papen
and General von Schleicher) whereby Rundstedt was forced against his will into
political affairs for a few days in consequence of the position he held in Berlin at
that time. He rose to the occasion and mastered the situation in a sphere that was
foreign to him with tact and competence' (Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt pp. 26 f.). An
accurate historical account of the events surrounding the removal from office of
Otto Braun can be found in H. Schulze, Otto Braun oder Preufiens demokrastche
Sendung: Eine BiograpAie (Frankfurt a.M., 1977), pp. 745-62. According to one military
biographer, Rundstedt felt uneasy in his position as Holder of Plenipotentiary
Powers for the Region of Greater Berlin and Brandenburg Province'. See C.
Messenger, The Last Prussian: A Biography of Field MarshalOrd von Rundstedt 1875-
1953 (London, 199 1), pp. 56 f.
109 BA-MA, N252/46, Liddell Hart to Blumentritt, 2 Mar. 1948, enclosing note headed,
'To whom it may concern': 'From my many discussions with General Blumentritt, as
well as other enquiries, I formed the opinion that he had an exceptionally liberal
and progressive outlook on political issues, and that his understanding of the real
meaning of democracy was far in advance of most of those whom I met. I felt that
he was one who might play a valuable part in the restoration of Germany on better
lines .'. A note with identical wording can be found at BA-MA, NachlIaB Kurt von
Tippelskirch, N281/7.
11 BA-MA, BW9/1544, Max Schwedtfeger to Speidel, Bonn, 2 Sept. 1952, in which he
refers to the evaluation of Busch given to Speidel by Liddell Hart, noting: 'I don't
believe we can fit him into the office at the moment, but later a position will
certainly be possible'.
l LHCMA, LHP 9/24/50, Bayerlein to Liddell Hart, 28 July 1952, and Liddell Hart to
Bayerlein, 1 Aug. 1952.
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for Liddell Hart, building up a network among the generals, as well
as amassing as much information on personalities as possible, was con-
ducted with the intention of establishing himself as an expert on West
German military affairs.
However, his intense interest in personnel questions was, after a
time, to raise suspicions. One of the most influential generals of all
in the rearmament campaign, Hans Speidel, came to an interesting
conclusion on Liddell Hart's motives, following a letter to Guinther
Blumentritt in June 1952:
I had a very detailed discussion with Liddell Hart, who, for my taste,
quizzed me rather too much and noted every word like a little news-
paper reporter. He brought English interests very strongly to the
fore, above all in the future armaments question. On the issue of
the 'war criminals' I was able to score a few points against him con-
cerning his friends Churchill and Eden . . . Besides, isn't itjust price-
less how L.H. involves himself in German personnel [issues] 112
Blumentritt replied to Speidel the following day, suggesting that Lid-
dell Hart's question on German personnel may have stemmed from
the British intelligence services.113 A week later, Speidel wrote once
again to Blumentritt, this time remarking that Blumentritt's opinion
of Liddell Hart confirmed his own, which had itself been supported
by those of others, and he concluded: 'One must be careful after all.'114
Speidel's suspicions as to Liddell Hart's motives remained, and three
years later, in discussing the activities of Geyr von Schweppenburg in
the international veterans' movement, Speidel remarked in a letter to
Colonel-General (rtd) Hans Reinhardt that Geyr was heavily involved
with Liddell Hart, 'without knowing exactly the background to this
personality'.115 Still, it may have been that Speidel was unaware of Lid-
dell Hart's previous 'success formula' with army personalities in Britain
and, along with Blumentritt, simply read too much into Liddell Hart's
behaviour. Certainly no written evidence has emerged to date in Lid-
dell Hart's papers that he carried out any work for the British secret
services. Indeed, for that matter, rather more the opposite situation
may have been the case, since Blumentritt made sure that all interest-
ing foreign correspondence he received was sent to the Blank Office
on a weekly basis to be combed for interesting information;116 more
than likely, Liddell Hart's letters to Blumentritt also found their way
into this rather unusual postbag on occasions.
There would seem to have been, though, a certain cooling off in
the relationship between Liddell Hart and some of the generals in the
mid-1950s. Apart from the fact that the Englishman was no longer as
11 BA-MA, N252/19, Speidel to Blumentritt, 19 June 1952.
1 BA-MA, BW9/1544, Blumentritt to Speidel, 20 June 1952.
114 BA-MA, N252/19, Speidel to Blumentritt, 26 June 1952.
"5 BA-MA, BW9/3369, Speidel to Generaloberst a.D. Reinhardt, 25 May 1955.
l16 BA-MA, BW9/1544, Blumentritt to Speidel, 27 Nov. 1952.
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useful to the generals as he had been in the critical years 1948-52, a
measure of resentment emerged due to Liddell Hart's exploitation of
his contacts with generals for his own purposes. This resentment can
clearly be seen on the part of Geyr von Schweppenburg, who was later
to describe Liddell Hart as 'an opportunist' 17 as well as someone wil-
ling to deal with former Nazis.18 Geyr, who had first met Liddell Hart
in the mid-1930s,119 in actual fact had had particularly close contact
with the writer during the rearmament debate, and was never reluctant
to make use of Liddell Hart's name.120 But despite his worries that
Liddell Hart was not discerning enough in his dealings with former
generals, he conceded in 1955, 'I do not in any way deny the excep-
tional courage, intellectual independence and also far-sighted attitude
which my friend Liddell Hart adopted after the war.'121 The gratitude
which many generals felt towards Liddell Hart for his efforts on their
behalf in the early postwar period was in most cases genuine.
Conclusions
Without doubt Liddell Hart's The Other Side of the Hill and Desmond
Young's Rommel biography, on which Liddell Hart had cooperated,122
exerted an enormous influence on public opinion in Britain, however
hard this might be to measure in retrospect.123 Indeed, these books
117 IfZ, ED91/333, Geyr von Schweppenburg to Heye, 24 July 1958.
8 IfZ, ED91/33, Geyr von Schweppenburg to de Hinterhoff, 22 Dec. 1955. Geyr - who
was a fiery anti-Nazi - writing much later, recalled an evening at Liddell Hart's
house in the summer of 1954, in which they had sat in his studio until deep into the
night, but where he noted with disapproval that there were 'photographs, with
dedications, of prominent Nazi generals'. (IfZ, ED91/44, Geyr von Schweppenburg,
Freie Jahre nach dem 2. Weltkrieg, ch. 19 of planned memoirs, unpublished TS,
n.d., p.42).
119 Geyr became acquainted with Liddell Hart during his time as military attach6 in
London, 1933-37. According to Geyr's diary, he first met Liddell Hart on 18 Mar.
1935 (IfZ, ED91/7(2), Tagebuch far die MilitUrattach6zeit in London, Brassel und
dem Haag), although it can be inferred from correspondence between the two in
Liddell Hart's Papers (LHP 9/24/61) that they may have already met the previous
year.
120 A good example of the use of Liddell Hart's reputation as an impartial authority is
the quotation by Geyr of a sentence from the writer's WAy Don X We Learn ftom
History? in one of his early postwar memoranda. See IfZ, ED134/19, [Geyr]
Gedanken flber Neutralisierug Gesamt-Deutschlands, Irschenhausen, 31 Mar. 1949,
which begins, 'It is unrealistic to ignore military principles and conditions in taking
political steps.'
121 IfZ, ED91/33, Geyr von Schweppenburg to de Hinterhoff, 22 Dec. 1955.
122 Young's biography was first published by Collins in 1950. In addition to Liddell Hart
and leading British military personalities, the generals Fritz Bayerlein and Hans
Speidel also assisted the author in his research (D. Young, Rommel (London, 1953),
pp. 5f.).
123 While newspaper reporting on former generals was not always positive, it is
informative to note an article from the Manchster Guardian from Sept. 1950 in which
the comment is made that the generals 'like, indeed, men of any profession - have
their own trade union, exchanging family news and tactical titbits, scattered far and
wide ... but very much alive and abreast of the times'. In fact, in the same positive
tone, the correspondent continued, 'Those to whom I have spoken seem to be
animated by no special desire for a "comeback", and have little in common with the
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prepared the public mind for a more positive reaction to various
memoirs by German generals which first began to appear in English
in 1951.124 Moreover, in Germany itself, there can be no doubt of the
significance of Liddell Hart's writings in the early 1950s. Some indi-
cation of this can be gained from a study by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft demo-
kratischer Kreise [Working group of democratic circles], a Bonn-based
political information service. In discussing the relations between vet-
erans' organizations from different European countries, the report
noted that difficulties had been encountered by German veterans'
organizations in working together with groups from the countries of
former opponents, and that this had been due to 'the events of the
war and public opinion'. Nonetheless, in addition to the change in
climate in world politics, 'much was achieved' through a series of
memoirs by German soldiers which were published abroad. Further,
'before the English coronation, the Rommel biography by the English-
man Young dominated the book shops more than the picture of
Queen Elizabeth.' Finally, the author of the report noted that, in assist-
ing those abroad to consider the spirit of the German people and its
soldiers, 'Particular understanding was awakened by the English mili-
tary writers Liddle [sic] Hart and Fuller.'125
As we have seen, the call for 'increased understanding' of the gen-
erals' viewpoint was part of a campaign to influence public opinion in
Germany and Britain, not to mention other European countries. Lid-
dell Hart was a willing participant in this campaign. The failure of
some historians to understand the German generals' motives in work-
ing with Liddell Hart stems essentially from a lack of understanding
of propaganda during the Cold War, and more specifically during the
debate on West German rearmament in Germany and Britain in the
conventional picture of martial men plotting darkly to return to power' ('Rearming
Germany: What the ex-Generals Think', Manchester Guardian, 1 9 July 1950). The
portrayal of the generals as men from just another normal profession strongly recalls
comments from Liddell Hart's The Other Side of the Hill.
124 Of course, reviews of generals' memoirs in Britain were often used as a platform for
advocating German rearmament. See e.g., 'German Generals as They See
Themselves', Economist, 14 and 21 Apr. 1951. In a review of Hans Speidel's We
defended Normandy, Lt.-Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks went as far as to state, 'I laid down
this interesting book with two thoughts uppermost in my mind. First - amazement,
that the Germans ... should have been so incredibly inefficient ... Second - relief,
that a man of Speidel's calibre should be available to help forge such German
armed forces as will be integrated into Western defence' ('Man Behind Rommel',
Sunday Times, 22 Apr. 1951).
125 H. Bohn, 'Intemationale Beziehungen zwischen den Organisationen der ehemaligen
Soldaten', ArbeitsgemeinscAaft demokratschr Kreise II, 7/53, pp. 21 f As to the effect of
the writings of Liddell Hart and Fuller on former high-ranking officers, here it is
also worth mentioning the observation of Hans Speier: 'When, in the early fifties,
the subject of the bombing of German cities was mentioned by German generals,
they cited unfailingly British professional criticism of its wastefulness and cruelty,
hiding their own condemnation of strategic air war behind the opinions of such
writers asJ.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart' (Gsrman Rearmament and Atomic Waro The
Views of Gkrman Militayy and Political Leaders (White Plains, NY, 1957), p. 34).
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early 1950s.126 In other words, one cannot understand the tributes of
German generals to the prescience of Liddell Hart's interwar theories
without taking into account the way in which they worked together
with him for the rearmament cause. Of course, to a degree he was
interested in fair treatment of the generals, as his attitude to the treat-
ment of Germany as a whole after the war demonstrates, while he also
undoubtedly relished his contacts with them on a personal and pro-
fessional level. Supporting their cause not only fitted in with his advo-
cacy of rearmament, his conversations and correspondence with them
also gave him considerable original material for his books.127 The
motives of the leading German generals were for their part more cyni-
cal: they sought to use Liddell Hart's name in the selling of their ver-
sion of the history of the war, which was itself intended to create a
different image of the German general to that peddled by the Allies
immediately after Germany's defeat. Satiating Liddell Hart's craving
for recognition with attestations to his 'influence' on German armour
doctrine must have seemed a cheap price to pay for his support in
underwriting their portrayal of events. Although for countless 'name-
less' generals who had disappeared into the obscurity of civilian life
after the war demanding a more positive image of their profession and
its leading representatives was often an end in itself, for those generals
campaigning with Liddell Hart for rearmament it was equally a means
to an end.
By way of conclusion, if one seeks to put the very special relationship
which existed between Liddell Hart and Wehrmacht generals into the
overall context of the former's career, a number of observations can
be made. First of all, undoubtedly Liddell Hart benefited greatly as a
writer from his contacts with the generals; on the one hand as a source
of information for his historical writing and on the other for support
in the efforts he was making to advertise the 'influence' of his theories
in Germany in the interwar period. However, the central motivating
force in the alliance between Liddell Hart and the most prominent
German generals was not historical research, but rather the exigencies
of the campaign for rearmament; a rehabilitation of the top generals
was seen as a crucial component of the public relations campaign
which had to be waged. Indeed, the degree of Liddell Hart's involve-
ment with former Wehrmacht generals in the campaign for rearma-
ment, and his considerable reliance on their views, goes a long way to
explaining much of his - and indeed others' - historical writing on
the Second World War. Finally, The Other Side of the Hill represents the
126 John Keegan, for example, referring to Liddell Hart's efforts to extract statements
from generals as to his influence on the German army, asks in a puzzled tone, if
Liddell Hart was already a busted flush, however, why should Guderian - "the father
of Blitzkirieg" - and Rommel's son and widow have yielded?' ('Mounting an
Offensive').
127 See e.g. the frequent references to generals in B.H. Liddell Hart, The Defence of the
West: Some Riddles of War and Peace (London, 1950), esp. to Guderian and von
Manteuffel.
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greatest paradox of his career. Intellectually and historically it was
highly tendentious. But as a work of skilful propaganda in the service
of the campaign for West German rearmament it may well have been
the book by which he achieved his greatest influence on the course of
history, with its subtle, yet ultimately far-reaching, effect on West Ger-
man attitudes towards the Wehrmacht generals in the 1950s, thus cru-
cially influencing public opinion on the remarmament issue.
Freie Unzversz'it Berlin
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